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Abstract 
 
Institutions matter within natural resource management. Whilst there are many examples of 
analyses of the nature and influence of institutions within fisheries, there are fewer examples 
of how institutions inform the practice and outcomes of co-management. This article reports 
on analysis of institutions and fisheries co-management in East African and Malawi inland 
fisheries informed by Critical Institutionalism. It concludes that relations between fisheries 
departments and local co-management structures, and between local government/traditional 
authorities and local co-management structures, and social, power and gender relations within 
and beyond fisheries communities, particularly impact on the practice and outcomes of co-
management. 
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A critical perspective on institutions and co-management of the inland fisheries of East 
Africa and Malawi  
 
Introduction 
Institutions play a critical role in determining the nature of access people have to natural 
resources and in influencing decision-making related to natural resource use, both in terms of 
who makes decisions and what those decisions are. Fisheries are no exception. As observed 
by Jentoft (2004, p. 138), “fisheries, like other socio-economic practices, could not exist 
without them [institutions]. Users would simply not know how to behave”. Institutions must, 
then, influence the process, nature and effects of the management of fisheries. Given that 
many fisheries worldwide are managed through a co-management arrangement, involving 
users and governments working together, institutions must also influence the nature, 
processes and outcomes of co-management. An understanding of the range of institutions that 
influence co-management, how and with what outcomes can inform the design, support and 
implementation of co-management. This is essential given the lack of evidence of success 
associated with co-management in some parts of the world in delivering on more sustainable 
fisheries (Béné et al., 2009; Hara & Raakjær Nielsen, 2003). 
 
Many approaches have been taken to the analysis of institutions within natural resource 
management, governance and livelihoods, with approaches often placed in two main 
categories: common property scholarship, with a focus on determining arrangements of 
formal rules more likely to lead to sustainable governance in a given situation, together with  
a further category such as political ecology (Agrawal, 2005), entitlements scholarship 
(Johnson, 2004; Lewins, 2007), governance (Sandström, 2009) and Critical Institutionalism 
(Cleaver, 2012). This second category of approaches share political economy and 
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sociological roots, with concerns including power inequalities, justice and struggle, and 
complexity in institutions that influence access to and benefits from natural resources. Hall, 
Cleaver, Franks & Maganga (2014) provide a synthesis of approaches that are ‘critical’ of the 
first, more mainstream, approach, critiquing common property approaches for assuming 
homogeneous communities, avoiding politics and involving inadequate social analyses. A 
more critical approach, Hall et al. (2014, p.82) argue, ‘tends to reflect complex and unequal 
relations around natural resources management’, with greater scope than common property 
scholarship for revealing diversity in institutions and power dynamics.  
 
In emphasizing the complexity of institutions in natural resource settings, Critical 
Institutionalism offers two areas of focus that complements other approaches to the analysis 
of institutions in natural resource settings, whether common property or approaches based on 
sociological roots. These two areas of emphasis are recognition of the role and influence of 
socially-embedded institutions beyond those designed for natural resource management, 
whether formal or informal, such as kinship, gender and power relations, and, secondly, how 
such institutions interact and engage with other institutions through ‘institutional bricolage’, 
reflecting the combinations and pathways of institutions used and navigated by resource users 
to gain and maintain access to and benefits from natural resources.  
 
Taking a Critical Institutionalism approach and highlighting these two characteristics, this 
article makes two contributions to literature on institutional analysis and natural resource co-
management. It first identifies the types of socially-embedded institutions that influence 
structures, processes and outcomes of co-management, and then examines how these interact 
with bureaucratic institutions (Cleaver 2002) (also referred to in the literature as ‘formal’) in 
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processes of institutional bricolage with implications for the design and practice of co-
management. 
 
The analysis presented here draws on published material on inland fisheries communities and 
co-management in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – largely drawing on research 
from Lake Victoria, but also other lake fisheries in Uganda) and Malawi in Southern Africa, 
largely by the authors of this paper (see, for example, Hara, 2011, 2006a, Hara, Donda & 
Njaya, 2002; Nunan, 2006, 2010, Nunan et al., 2012; Onyango & Jentoft, 2007, 2010, 2011). 
A number of fisheries co-management arrangements were initiated on some of the largest and 
most productive water bodies in Africa including Lake Victoria and Lake Malawi since the 
1990s. The authors have been involved in these initiatives and draw on evidence from their 
research on institutions in the fisheries communities and on the processes and performance of 
co-management through the lens of Critical Institutionalism.  
 
The article proceeds by reviewing approaches to institutional analysis, before examining how 
this has been applied within fisheries, noting that there is little literature that examines the 
interactions between institutions and co-management directly. Analysis is then presented of 
the bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutional landscape within East African and 
Malawi inland fisheries, before examining the implications of these for processes and 
outcomes of co-management. 
 
Institutional analysis: towards a critical perspective  
Institutions are widely seen as being at the core of how natural resources are managed and 
governed (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Cleaver, 2012; Ostrom, 1990). They 
influence whether and how people get access to resources, how much they can access, when, 
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for how long and access to which resources. Institutions influence whose voice matters in 
decision-making and what kinds of practices are accepted despite formal decisions and rules. 
Understanding of fisheries co-management then entails a need to identify and understand 
which institutions play a role in access and management. To do this, clarity is needed as to 
how institutions are understood.  
 
One of the most commonly cited definitions of institutions is that given by North, who 
described them as being “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, which “reduce uncertainty by 
providing a structure to everyday life” (North, 1990, p. 3). This definition is widely used 
within literature on environment and natural resources, with Leach, Mearns, and Scoones’ 
(1997, p. 5) definition reflecting North’s, seeing institutions as “regularized patterns of 
behavior between individuals and groups in society”. Cleaver (2012, p. 8) expands on this, 
defining them as “arrangements between people which are reproduced and regularised across 
time and space and which are subject to constant processes of evolution and change”. It is not 
then necessarily the case that institutions can be seen or touched, nor is it possible to 
accurately predict which institutions matter most in a natural resource management situation. 
Institutions can be hard to identify and understand and may change over time, or their role 
and influence may also change. 
 
Critical Institutionalism (CI) offers particular insight into institutions, whether formal or 
informal, and natural resource governance, as it encourages investigation into institutions 
beyond as well as within natural resource management and highlights the interaction of 
institutions through processes of ‘bricolage’ through which people navigate access to and 
benefits from natural resources. The approach emphasizes “the historical formation of 
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institutions and the complex interplay between modern and traditional, formal and informal 
arrangements” (Cleaver, Franks, Maganga, & Hall, 2013, p. 168), with institutional bricolage 
consisting of “the processes in which people (consciously or unconsciously) draw on existing 
social formulae and arrangements (rules, traditions, norms, roles and relationships) to patch 
together institutions in response to changing situations” (Cleaver et al., 2013, p.168).  
 
In contrast to a ‘mainstream’ approach, or common property scholarship, (Cleaver, 2012; 
Hall et al., 2014), a CI perspective does not suggest that there are rules or principles which 
should be adopted for sustainable natural resource management, but instead responds to the 
complexity of people’s lives and management situations, recognising that institutions with 
influence over how natural resources are used are not necessarily ‘designed’ or ‘developed’ 
with natural resource management in mind. They are, instead, closely associated with social 
life and interactions, with power relations, kinship and gender norms. Cleaver (2012) brings 
together thinking that draws on multiple perspectives and approaches − including political 
ecology, ethnography and legal pluralism – that contribute to defining characteristics of CI, 
including institutional bricolage and the importance of power in analyses of institutions and 
natural resource management. In summary, CI is seen by Hall et al. (2014, p. 73) as having 
three areas of emphasis: “(i) complexity of institutions entwined in everyday social life; (ii) 
their historical formation; and (iii) the interplay between the traditional and the modern, 
formal and informal arrangements”. 
 
The CI perspective then emphasises the role and influence of multiple bureaucratic and 
socially-embedded institutions in mediating access to natural resources and in processes of 
management and decision-making. Institutions within and beyond the natural resource system 
are relevant, between actors operating at different levels of governance, from the local to the 
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international, and from different social settings. Identifying and understanding such 
institutions requires attention beyond structures for fisheries management, getting at the 
underlying social and power relations of importance (Béné et al., 2009; Onyango & Jentoft, 
2007). 
 
Institutions and fisheries co-management 
Co-management has been adopted internationally in response to the perceived failure of 
centralised management of fisheries in preventing the decline of fish stocks and the lack of 
government resources to effectively manage fisheries (Raakjær Nielsen et al., 2004; Wilson, 
Raakjær Nielsen, & Degnbol, 2003). Defined as “an arrangement where responsibility for 
resource management is shared between the government and user groups” (Sen & Raakjær 
Nielsen 1996, p. 406), a spectrum of co-management reflects the degree of user participation 
and devolved power ranging from consultation and very limited participation to community-
led management (Sen and Raakjær Nielsen, 1996). Central to the implementation of fisheries 
co-management is the design of new structures (Hara & Raakjær Nielsen, 2003; Ratner, Oh, 
& Pomeroy, 2012; Wilson et al., 2010), bringing together stakeholders for decision-making 
and implementation. The creation of structures for co-management is usually informed by 
government regulations and guidance, sometimes building on existing committees and 
arrangements, with committees created at the landing site, or beach, level, and fisheries-wide, 
with committees in-between depending on the size and nature of the fishery. The process of 
design and implementation of co-management in developing country settings is very often 
top-down, usually supported by donor funding (Cinner et al., 2012; Hara & Raakjær Nielsen, 
2003). One of the problems with this approach is that new structures are not formed within an 
institutional vacuum, yet the design and implementation rarely takes into account the 
institutional landscape and diversity that will impact on the functioning and performance of 
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the structures (Onyango & Jentoft, 2007). How these new structures and systems work, and 
how well they work, will be influenced by institutions already existing within and beyond the 
fisheries setting; institutions both related to fisheries and those that are not directly associated 
with fisheries. These institutions may be challenged by the introduction of a new 
management approach or may be further entrenched; they may enable the new management 
arrangement and/or constrain it and limit its effectiveness. 
 
Institutional analyses within fisheries research and policy have largely been informed by 
rational choice perspectives (Chuenpagdee & Song, 2012; de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 
2010; Jentoft, 2004; Johnson, 2010), where economic incentives are assumed to drive 
individual behaviour, leading to the design of rules and regulations that encourage certain 
practices. There is, however, increasing recognition of the value of taking a broader 
institutional perspective, particularly one that “seeks to understand institutions as complex 
and multifaceted, shaping different behavioral outcomes, as well as being shaped and 
reshaped by everyday human practice” (de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 2010, p.77). 
Chuenpagdee and Song (2012, p.312) suggest that studies that have taken a wider 
institutional analysis have shown that “community norms, trust relations, values and beliefs, 
historical factors, and social and cultural meanings, as well as community organization, form 
an essential underpinning of any fisheries institution, in addition to the codified or informal 
rule system”.  
 
Many of the examples of the application of a broader institutional analysis within fisheries 
focus on analysing which institutions influence behaviour, practices and attitudes, how and 
with what implications (see, for example, de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 2010; Nunan, 
2006). There is, however, limited literature on analyses of institutions in relation to the 
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structures, systems and practice of fisheries co-management in a developing country context. 
Lessons can be surmised for fisheries co-management from existing literature on institutional 
analysis in fisheries, but more explicit analysis exploring the interactions between institutions 
and co-management practice would bring out the lessons more clearly. Of course, co-
management is itself seen as a form of institutional arrangement within fisheries 
(Chuenpagdee & Song, 2012), meaning that co-management is constructed of institutions as 
well as being shaped and influenced by institutions. This may complicate analysis and 
conclusions, but does not negate the potential benefits of investigating the influence and 
interactions of institutions on co-management. 
 
The analysis of institutions and co-management in inland fisheries in East Africa and Malawi 
draws on the growing attention within fisheries literature on broad institutional analyses 
(Chuenpagdee & Song, 2012; de la Torre-Castro & Lindström, 2010), which can be informed 
by Critical Institutionalism and the concept of institutional bricolage. The case studies 
therefore involve the identification of a broad range of bureaucratic and socially-embedded 
institutions that have been shown to influence and inform the structures, practice and 
outcomes of fisheries co-management.  
 
Institutions and co-management in inland fisheries in East Africa and Malawi 
This section identifies and analyses the nature of institutions that impact on the interpretation 
and practice of co-management, focusing on the ‘beach’ level, the level at which co-
management is particularly operationalized. After briefly introducing the co-management 
context in East Africa and Malawi, bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions are 
identified that are manifested within the beach-level fisheries. Examples of institutional 
bricolage are discussed, followed by reflection on implications for fisheries co-management.  
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East Africa 
The introduction of co-management in the Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda by the departments 
of fisheries was supported by a number of internationally funded projects, beginning with the 
Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project, from the late 1990s. The adoption of co-
management reflected similar initiatives in many other parts of the world, but also responded 
to concern relating to perceptions of the prevalence of illegalities within fisheries and 
inadequate capacity within the fisheries departments to effectively manage the lake fisheries. 
To date, most co-management experience and research in the region is associated with Lake 
Victoria, the second largest freshwater body in the world, bordered by Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda.  
 
Co-management in the region has taken a top-down, structural approach, with an emphasis on 
supporting the formation of community-based structures known as Beach Management Units 
(BMUs). All people working within fisheries at a landing site are required to register with the 
BMU for that landing site (a BMU may cover one or more landing sites), forming the BMU 
Assembly from which a Committee, with between nine to fifteen members, is elected every 
few years. National guidelines and legislation require that the committee members include 
representation from different occupational groups and at least three of the members should be 
women. Representatives from BMUs should also meet with fisheries officers at multiple 
levels in Co-management Committees and form BMU Networks at district, regional and 
national levels.  
 
Evidence suggests that the level of activity and effectiveness of co-management in terms of 
increasing compliance and fish stocks in East Africa is very mixed amongst the BMUs 
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(Kanyange, Kimani, Onyango, Sweenarian, & Yvergniaux, 2014; Onyango & Jentoft, 2007), 
in part reflecting the short term nature of project support for co-management and insufficient 
ongoing support from government. BMUs have, however, improved the extent of registration 
of fishers and facilitated licensing. At least 90% of all boats, up from about 60%, are now 
registered on the Tanzanian side of the lake (Onyango, 2014). There is increased involvement 
of boat crew, boat owners and repairers, women, youth and elders as well as traders in 
managing the fisheries and cases of improved collaboration between fishers and government 
officials, especially the District Fisheries Officers, with BMU members sending periodic 
reports on the status of illegal and BMU activities for assistance and planning. However, 
concern remains about the level of fishing capacity, the extent of illegalities and the stock 
levels of Nile perch in particular (Mkumbo & Marshall, 2014).  
 
Bureaucratic institutions 
The formation and operation of co-management structures are situated within national and 
regional policy and legislation within the fisheries sector, setting out the process of forming 
BMUs, BMU Networks and Co-management Committees and the functions of each (e.g. see 
LVFO, 2007). In addition to these, many other areas of government policy and legislation 
affect co-management structures and processes, including national and sub-national 
development plans (see Nunan, 2014).  
 
BMUs are a key bureaucratic institution at the beach level, with which socially-embedded 
institutions interact and influence behaviour and practice. The prevalent view of what BMUs 
are and what they should be doing within the Fisheries Departments influences the perception 
of, and attitudes to, BMUs as well as relationships between government staff and BMU 
members. BMUs are widely seen as being an extension of the Fisheries Departments, even 
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though this is not formally noted in any legal document (Onyango and Jentoft, 2010). The 
Lake Victoria fisheries co-management guidelines define a BMU as “an organization of 
fisher folk at the beach (boat crew, boat owners, managers, charterers, fish processors, 
fishmongers, local gear makers or repairers and fishing equipment dealers) within a fishing 
community” (LVFO, 2007, p. 9); a very loose definition, open to interpretation about the 
nature and status of the organization. BMUs are, however, required to be registered with the 
national fisheries department, which does lend support to the view of BMUs being an arm of 
government amongst many fisheries department staff.  
 
In addition to the BMUs and Co-management Committees, local government structures at 
multiple levels affect the nature and performance of co-management through development 
planning, resource allocation, revenue raising and enforcement, as well as through 
interpersonal relationships between members of committees. At the village or landing site 
level, relationships between BMUs and government are particularly important as this is the 
level at which co-management is really operationalized. Conflict between local government 
village councils and BMUs has been experienced at some locations due to power struggles 
and competition over revenue-raising within fisheries. BMUs were given revenue-raising 
powers yet the fisheries sector is also an important revenue source for local and national 
governments, creating conditions for competition and conflict between the structures. Both 
structures also have an enforcement remit, again creating the potential for conflict and 
differing approaches, as well as opportunities for cooperation and collaboration. Political 
influence over the composition and operation of BMUs has also occurred at the local level, 
with political connections enabling certain individuals to gain more powerful positions within 
the BMU Committees.  
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Courts play an important role in the enforcement of legislation, having the mandate to decide 
on criminal and civil cases, including within fisheries. Serious cases such as use of illegal 
gears are handled by the district magistrate courts, though as noted by Kjær (2015), not all 
cases make it to court, with payments made or interference by politicians preventing cases 
from reaching court. BMUs have power to decide on minor cases such as conflict arising 
from fishing gear entanglement between two fishers or physical fights among fishers.  
 
Rules-in-use that represent bureaucratic institutions at the beach level include the requirement 
that newcomers report to the BMU office on arrival and before engaging in fisheries 
activities. A payment may be required to operate from a beach, which could be in terms of 
fish rather than money. There is also scope for BMUs to propose bylaws for endorsement by 
government and to develop their own local rules and regulations for approval by the BMU 
Assembly.  
 
Socially-embedded institutions 
Socially-embedded institutions of relevance include social and power relations between BMU 
members and Fisheries Officers and between boat owners, crew and fish agents, with power 
relations reflecting positions of authority, ability to enforce rules and wealth. Gender relations 
among and between women and men also influence behaviour and access to benefits from 
fisheries resources, with implications for engagement with co-management processes and 
structures. 
 
Interpersonal relations are crucial within the inland fisheries for accessing employment and 
fish for processing and trade, and are imbued with power dynamics. Boat owners and fish 
agents, who buy fish for the processing plants, have more power and resources than the boat 
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crew employed by boat owners and many of the smaller-scale traders and processors, many 
of whom are women. Access to employment is in part dependent on interpersonal relations 
between crew and between crew and boat owners (Nunan, 2006, 2010), with such relations 
also connected to the target fishery of crew (Nile perch, Nile tilapia or dagaa) and types of 
gears used in the Nile perch fishery – whether gillnets or longlines (Beuving, 2014). These 
social relations facilitate the movement of fisherfolk between landing sites, moving in search 
of higher prices and better catches. Nunan et al. (2012) report that around 50% of boat crew 
move between landing sites around Lake Victoria. This high level of movement is not only 
facilitated by social relations and norms, but contributes to the shaping of institutional 
arrangements at beach level. Norms and practices at one site may be transferred or adapted at 
other landing sites through migration and social relations. This flow and shaping of 
institutions reflects the influence of negotiated relations and power dynamics between 
fisheries actors, which in turn impacts on decisions on fisheries practices and on the power, 
remit and activities of BMUs. 
 
Gendered relations and norms affect attitudes, behaviour and practices at the landing sites of 
Lake Victoria, with sex transacted for access to fish at many landing sites (Nunan, 2010). 
There are often far fewer women than men at the fish landing sites, with women not only 
involved in processing and trading fish, but also in cooking food, providing accommodation, 
particularly to migrants, and entering into relationships with fishermen. Gendered relations of 
power operate amongst men and women as well, with more powerful opinion leaders and 
boat owners, for example, influencing the behaviour and practices of male boat crew, and 
wives of boat owners receiving preferential access to fish from the catch amongst women at a 
landing site. It has been estimated that women make up around a third of the population at the 
landing sites (LVFO, ND) and that whilst most BMUs, at least in the mid-2000s, complied 
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with the requirement for at least three of the Committee members to be women, the majority 
of BMU Chairs were men and very few women went onto represent BMUs in BMU 
Networks and Co-management Committees (Nunan et al., 2012). Lwenya, Mbilingi, 
Luomba, and Yongo (2009) suggest that cultural norms prevent women from putting 
themselves forward for nomination for top positions, as well having less economic power 
with which to influence voters.  
 
These interpersonal relations affect the structures and processes of co-management in many 
ways, from who stands for election onto the BMU Committees to how the BMU Committee 
members behave in relation to fisheries practices. Socially-embedded institutions may both 
facilitate and constrain the potential for effective fisheries co-management. The range of 
interpersonal relations may encourage participation in BMU activities, such as monitoring for 
illegal activities, but they may also encourage, or at least turn a blind eye towards, such 
practices.  
 
Institutional bricolage 
Actors at all levels adapt and draw on a range of institutions to support their fisheries-related 
livelihoods that impact on the nature and performance of co-management, as well as draw on 
these institutions to enable or frustrate co-management activities. When BMUs were 
introduced to local fishing communities by the Fisheries Departments, the initiatives were 
reinterpreted and transformed by various actors who occupy different positions of power and 
authority in the fisheries communities. Within these different positions, there has been a 
continuous state of interaction and negotiation among the actors. The remit and activities of 
BMUs filter through these diverse interests and are given new meanings in the fisheries 
societies. Local cultural norms, beliefs and practices influence the range of meanings given to 
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BMUs, the level of acceptance and how the new institutional arrangements become 
embedded in the community. Behaviour and relationships that the BMU bring with it are 
understood within a larger unit of reference in which it is embedded. Therefore the BMU as 
an institution is accepted in as far as it does not interfere with a fisher community’s ways of 
working and living.  
 
An example of this includes the enforcement of gear restrictions only for interpersonal 
relations between fishers and BMU Committee members, village council members and/or 
fisheries officers to be used to enable a bribe to be paid for the return of confiscated gears 
(Barratt, Seeley & Allison, 2014; Jentoft, Onyango & Islam, 2010). Politicians are not keen 
either to support strict enforcement as it could damage their chances of re-election as well as 
potentially go against powerful interests, such as the reported involvement of the army in 
Uganda in trade in undersized fish (Kjær, 2015). Some fisherfolk, then,  navigate through a 
range of bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions to continue fisheries illegalities 
through fines, bribes, friendship, kinship and power relations with members of village 
governments, BMU Committee members, police officers and politicians. 
 
Access to fisheries, and to benefits from fisheries, illustrates processes of institutional 
bricolage with bureaucratic institutions to be complied with including fishing permits, boat 
licenses and trading licenses. Social and power relations interact with these bureaucratic 
institutions, with relationships between boat crew, crew and boat owners, and women and 
men, critical for gaining access to employment and fish for processing and sale. 
 
Interactions of fisherfolk with fish agents at the more commercialised landing sites provide a 
further example of institutional bricolage. Fish agents are not employed by processing 
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factories but supply Nile perch to certain factories. They may also own boats and have strong 
connections to the lake fisheries. They often provide an essential service to boat owners and 
crew through providing loans for fishing gear, which are repaid through selling fish to that 
particular agent, thereby providing a guaranteed supply of fish, but may result in lower prices 
and income for the boat owner and/or crew (Jentoft et al., 2010). Interpersonal relations and 
trust enable this credit-based relation to facilitate employment, fisheries activities and the 
livelihood of the fish agent. The more formalised role of the agent is complemented by this 
informal credit supply, supported by interpersonal relations.  
 
Malawi 
Co-management was introduced as a donor funded project
i
 by the government in the 1990s in 
response the dramatic decline in the fish catches of Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire 
River. The Government launched a pilot co-management programme for the two areas in 
order to address the negative catch trends in the two water bodies (Hara, Donda, & Njaya, 
2002; Russell & Dobson, 2011a). The arrangement was extended to the Southeast Arm of 
Lake Malawi (see Figure 1 for a map of Malawi) a few years later as part of the second phase 
of the German funded project (Hara, 2006b) and then to the rest of Lake Malawi and lower 
Shire by the government on its own as part of its management operations.  
 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
On Lake Chilwa, co-management was introduced in 1995 as a crisis response to the three-
year drought (1992-94) that caused complete drying out of the lake, supported by donor 
funding. Co-management was initiated by fishers on Lake Chiuta in the mid-1990s when they 
invited the Department of Fisheries to partner them in management of the fishery on the lake 
19 
 
in order to legitimise the eviction of about 300 migrant seine net fishers from Lake Malombe 
that the local fishers had just successfully (amid violence) undertaken on their own (Njaya, 
2005). All in all over 330 Beach Village Committees (BVCs) had been formed in all waters 
bodies nationally by 1999. Of these 256 are on Lake Malawi. Performance of these BVCs is 
mixed, with many not functional as a result of reliance on inadequate government financial 
support. 
 
Despite over fifteen years of implementation, co-management has not had a positive effect on 
the catch trends on Lake Malombe, with production remaining below 2000 tonnes annually 
compared to an average of around 10000 between 1982 and 1992 (Department of Fisheries, 
2010).  On the Southeast Arm, catches (especially of the high value chambo) have continued 
to decline (Hara, 2006b, 2011), while on Lake Chilwa, fishers still struggle to assert 
themselves in relation to controlling the social behaviour and destructive fishing 
activities/methods of migrant fishers from Mangochi. On Lake Chiuta, the fishers appear to 
have succeeded in keeping out seine nets from the Lake and catches have stabilised optimally 
(Njaya, 2007; Russell & Dobson, 2011a). 
 
Bureaucratic institutions 
The co-management approach in Malawi has been implemented through the formation of 
BVCs as the organisational structure for participatory management (Hara et al., 2002; Russell 
& Dobson, 2008, 2011a). BVCs are supposed to be democratically elected organisations 
meant to represent the fishers and residents of a beach/village (some beaches are shared by 
more than one village while some villages have more than one beach). The organisational 
format of BVCs includes village headpersons as ex-officio members (Hara et al. 2002). The 
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formation of BVCs is usually facilitated by the Department of Fisheries, except in Lake 
Chiuta.  
 
The introduction of ‘participatory fisheries management’, as co-management is referred to in 
Malawi, was legitimised through the revised Fisheries Conservation and Management Act No 
25 of 1997. Part III of the revised Act provides for community participation in fisheries 
management and sections 9 of Part II and 25 of Part V of the subsidiary legislation of 2000 of 
the revised Act gives the Director of Fisheries power to appoint ‘honorary fisheries officers’ 
for local areas, with power to enforce fisheries regulations in their area. To this effect, BVCs 
can be appointed in the capacity of honorary fisheries management bodies in their areas of 
jurisdiction (Government of Malawi, 1997) either to effect regulations emanating from the 
Act or to implement by-laws.  
 
Beyond the fisheries sector, the administrative decentralization policy (Government of 
Malawi, 1998a) detailed in the Local Government Act (Government of Malawi, 1998b) aims 
to create elected District Councils (DCs). Below the DC are supposed to be Area 
Development Committees (ADCs) at Group Village headperson level and Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) at village level (Hara, 2008). The ADCs will be chaired 
by Group Village Headpersons while VDCs by village headpersons. These structures are 
supposed to be democratic structures for bottom-up planning of development initiatives and 
environmental management (Government of Malawi, 1996). Although VDCs and ADCs had 
been formed and the latest re-elections for these took place in September 2013, elections for 
councillors were only held once in 2000 after legislation for decentralization was passed due 
to political in-fighting (Tambulasi, 2011).  
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Under administrative decentralization, the status of BVCs remains unresolved: whether their 
work will be assumed by VDCs or they will continue to exist (Hara, 2008). If they are to 
continue existing, the question becomes then whether as independent bodies or under VDCs. 
Implementation of administrative decentralization remains unfulfilled because of lack of a 
shared vision for decentralisation and battles around voting powers and fears of loss of power 
at a higher level among government departments/ministries (some departments have started 
implementing some aspects of decentralisation while others have not), politicians and 
Traditional Authorities. Local government elections for councillors were finally held in May 
2014, having been postponed several times since 2000. 
 
Magistrates courts are also statutory institutions that have powers to decide both criminal and 
civil cases (Gloppen & Kanyongolo, 2007). This followed the abolition of Traditional 
Courts
ii
, which were presided over by chiefs, as part of transition towards democracy. 
Whereas before the prosecutor had the choice of either taking fisheries offences to 
Traditional courts or Magistrates courts, all fisheries offences can now only be tried in 
Magistrate courts. In practice though, traditional and other community leaders perform tasks 
similar to those that the constitution entrusts to judicial courts in an informal way based on 
their interpretation and application of customary laws (Gloppen & Kanyongolo, 2007). Even 
then, traditional authorities do not have powers based on state laws nor are they recognised as 
part of the formal judicial structure even in the interpretation and application of customary 
law. In principle traditional authorities can only mediate between disputing parties. For co-
management, this has been problematic since one of the assumptions had been that chiefs 
could be empowered to sanction offenders in Traditional courts and/or village customary 
courts as part of devolving power and authority for fisheries management (Hara et al., 2002; 
Russell & Dobson, 2011a, 2011b). 
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Crew members play a limited role in formal co-management structures, at least in part due to 
the definition of fisher by the Department of Fisheries, which defines a fisher as a gear owner 
(Hara, 2006a). This is despite the fact that gear owners do not usually go out fishing, but 
employ crew members. It is crew members who take most of the operational fishing 
decisions out on the lake, including illegal fishing methods/activities. This is crucial in that in 
most cases crew members are not invited to serve on co-management committees, yet these 
committees take most of the critical decisions around regulations.  
 
Socially-embedded institutions 
Socially-embedded institutions with influence over the nature and effectiveness of co-
management are wide ranging, from the Traditional Authorities to interpersonal relations 
between crew members and boat/gear owners and crew members. Gender relations are also 
significant with cultural norms limiting the participation of women in fisheries activities and 
co-management structures. 
 
Interpersonal relations of crew members are important for gaining and controlling entry to 
employment as crew members are usually responsible for recruiting a team without the 
involvement of the gear owner. Crew members recruit each other based on kinship, ethnicity, 
language and other cultural factors. In some areas (e.g. Malombe), the crew members control 
who can work from and at their beaches. In this way, migrant boat/gear owners cannot bring 
their own crews, but rather have to employ crews from the beach/village/area. 
 
Cultural and religious norms influence the degree and nature of access that women generally 
have to fisheries and decision-making in Malawi. Women gear owners (some buy gears or 
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inherit gears from deceased husbands) have difficulties in taking full control of their gears as 
a result of cultural and religious attitudes that frown upon women going to the beach to 
oversee the sale of catch from their gear. Women often have to act through a male relative or 
the head of the crew in terms of managing the fishing unit. As a result most are exploited and 
fail to secure maximum benefits from their units (Hara & Jul Larsen, 2003). In addition to 
there being few women on BVCs due to cultural norms, they are also not accepted because 
fishers generally do not believe that non-fishers should be on the BVC, including fish 
traders
iii
, as they are very mobile. Fishers argue that if BVCs are made up of non-fishers who 
have no involvement with (or knowledge of) fisheries, such BVCs are likely to pass by-laws 
that are not appropriate or perceived as fair by fishers.  
 
Socially-embedded institutions associated with credit arrangements, migrants and religious 
beliefs also influence fisheries practices. Loans for fishing gear and to assist in times when 
fish are scarce commits fishers to selling fish to certain people and/or at certain prices. 
Migrants to Lake Malombe report that it is almost impossible to own and operate gear as a 
‘foreigner’, with local elites gatekeeping against this. Migrant gear owners have to act 
through a local person, in which case s/he will struggle to have control of operations in their 
unit. However, fishers are often reluctant to introduce limits on access for migrants due to the 
need to maintain historical reciprocity, i.e. at one time or another they will also need to 
migrate and fish elsewhere and they will need to be allowed to fish in other areas and from 
other fishers’ villages and communities.  
 
Institutional bricolage 
Socially-embedded and bureaucratic institutions influence, and are utilised by, three key 
sources of power and authority, namely the DoF, chiefs and the fishers. Thus the activities, 
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efficacy and acceptability of BVCs are influenced by negotiating through the institutional 
landscape associated with these actors and within the communities that they are embedded. 
Processes of institutional bricolage that draw on institutions associated with these actors can 
be seen in a number of areas of fisheries activities including enforcement of regulations, 
access to employment and fish and fish trading.   
 
The role of powerful TAs (both as ex-officio members of BVCs and as local customary 
leaders/rulers) has made it difficult for the BVCs to assert their own authority. In this context, 
village heads claim that the BVCs draw their authority from them; hence, the BVCs should 
fall under their authority while BVCs believe that they are and should be independent entities 
(Hara et al., 2002; Russell & Dobson, 2011a). Due to the continuation of the exercise of 
customary authority within villages by the village headpersons, the BVCs have difficulties 
disciplining fisheries regulation offenders within their jurisdiction without the (sanctional) 
authority of village headpersons. This leaves most BVCs dependent on the village 
headpersons for effective exercise of their functions (Hara et al., 2002; Njaya, 2007; Njaya et 
al., 2012; Russell & Dobson, 2011a). On Lake Chita, village headpersons had been excluded 
from BVCs. As a result, the BVCs have much greater legitimacy among fishers, they enforce 
regulations of their own and have managed to exclude seine fishers since they drove them out 
in 1995. Village headpersons do not have powers to override the decisions of BVCs. On Lake 
Chilwa, the BVCs were initially dominated by TAs who were using these to extract benefits 
from fishers through fines as penalties for infringing regulations and also allowing migrant 
fishers from Mangochi to settle and fish on the lake. Fishers have increasingly tried to take 
over the BVCs in order to use them as vehicles for controlling access for migrants (Njaya, 
2007).  
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Enforcement of regulations is enabled and constrained through institutional bricolage, with 
both formal and local informal rules being used to both enforce and bypass regulations. 
Bureaucratic institutions of policy, legislation and enforcement patrols are ignored at times 
by BVCs, chiefs and elders. Although BVCs have power to enforce formal regulations in 
their areas of jurisdiction, most are reluctant to do so for fear of reprisals from fishers and 
safety of confiscated gears. In Lake Chiuta, though, BVCs successfully excluded seine netters 
and strictly enforced both formal and locally developed rules on their own without the 
assistance of the DoF or local chiefs. The key to such cohesion among fishers is due to the 
exclusion of chiefs from BVCs because chiefs had played a part in allowing seine netters 
onto the lake corruptively even after it had been agreed to ban seine netting on Lake Chiuta 
by all stakeholders (Njaya, 2005). Bribes to fisheries enforcement officers, BVC members 
and chiefs for facilitating illegal activities are regularly reported in most areas. Chiefs and 
elders, for example, at times suspend regulations such as the closed season if they wish to 
support fishers in providing for functions such as a funeral, wedding or initiation ceremonies.  
 
Access to fish and benefits from fishing is negotiated mainly through socially-embedded 
institutions since officially there are no regulations limiting entry. Licensing is only used for 
revenue collection. BVCs are supposed to issue transfer letters to their members and 
receiving BVCs to demand transfer letters from migrant fishers from their home BVCs. At 
the same time chiefs run their own parallel permit systems for both migrant and local fishers 
based on collection of weekly honorarium from all fishers fishing from their villages. 
Employment within fishing units is controlled between gear owners and crewmembers, with 
recruitment into crews controlled by existing crewmembers. Within villages where beach 
seines are operated, there has always been local historical understanding and agreement in 
terms of who can operate their nets from specific village beaches, with the exclusion of all 
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other beach seines from a specific beach. Among those that can operate from a specific 
beach, there is further agreement in terms of fishing in turns and the order in which the nets 
will be thrown among those with access. In this way, outsiders from a beach are excluded and 
conflict among those that have access is ameliorated. DoF, BVCs and chiefs support such 
traditional and historical fishing practices that actually both limit access, effort and also able 
fishers to fish without conflict.  
 
Fish trading is not formalised, as traders are not required to have a license to go into fish 
trade though there is legislation to be complied with. Buying fish is highly competitive, with 
auction systems common. Such competition fuels illegal activities such as use of under mesh 
size nets, fishing during closed seasons and landing and selling of undersized fish. While in 
some waters bodies such as Chiuta the BVCs limit such activities, in most of the other water 
bodies BVCs battle to enforce these regulations. In addition the common arrangement found 
in many small-scale fisheries whereby traders give loans for gears and out-of-season cash 
loans to gear owners and crew members, to be paid back during fishing season, also exists in 
Malawi. In such contexts, the traders can gain advantage through the loans, which prioritises 
him/her for buying of fish. Such prioritisation can also be through kinship or spousal 
relationships.  
 
Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions that operate within 
East African inland fisheries and Malawi that affect behaviour and decision-making and 
examples of institutional bricolage that result. 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
27 
 
 
Examples of how institutional bricolage affects co-management in East Africa and Malawi 
were seen to stem from relations between fisherfolk and staff of government Fisheries 
Departments, interactions between members of BMUs/BVCs and local government and/or 
Traditional Authorities and the range of interpersonal relations interacting with policy, 
legislation and formal processes in accessing benefits from fisheries and enforcing 
regulations. This section further reflects on how institutional bricolage affects the 
composition and operation of local co-management committees, relations between BMUs, 
fisherfolk and local government, whether village councils or fisheries officers, enforcement 
of rules and regulations and accessing benefits from the fisheries. 
 
In both East Africa and Malawi, the composition and function of local co-management 
structures is affected by power relations, gender relations and norms, and kinship. These 
institutions influence who stands for election, who voters support and who is listened to 
within decision-making fora. On Lake Victoria in East Africa, male boat owners have 
dominated the position of Chair of the BMU Committees and the space and opportunity for 
the participation of migrating fisherfolk, mainly boat crew, in these committees is limited 
(Nunan et al., 2012). Boat crew are largely excluded from BVCs in Malawi due to the 
definition of a ‘fisher’ adopted in national legislation and no requirement for their 
participation. The more powerful traditional authorities in Malawi are, however, involved in 
fisheries co-management despite not necessarily being involved with fisheries directly.  
 
Gender relations are reflected in the composition of community-based fisheries management 
structures, with women at times benefiting from affirmative action, though this does not 
necessarily challenge the dominance of men in decision-making or ensure that women’s 
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views and concerns are taken into consideration. Gender norms and relations have muted the 
potential empowering opportunity of co-management for many women and the opportunity 
for fisheries management to benefit from the experience and knowledge of women in 
fisheries. Decision-making within fisheries is observed to be patriarchal, with the voice of 
fisherwomen “unheard” even within co-management approaches, leading to a call for a 
gendered perspective in systems of policy formulation within fisheries (FAO, 2012; Onyango 
& Jentoft, 2011). This lack of recognition of women in fisheries is reflected in the lack of 
gendered perspective taken to the design, support and analysis of co-management. Power 
relations interact with formal institutions of policy and legislation to maintain the dominance 
of powerful actors in fisheries management at the beach level. 
 
Relationships between those in fisheries communities and government fisheries officers are 
particularly important as they are unequal in terms of authority, recourse to the law, remit and 
access to resources. The introduction of co-management calls for a change in this 
relationship, moving towards more of a cooperative, equal relationship, with trust being 
critical to successful collaboration. This may not necessarily materialize, due to different 
understandings of co-management, insufficient training and perhaps an unwillingness to 
change. The perception of the status and remit of local co-management structures by 
Fisheries Departments affects the relationships between resource users and fisheries officers, 
with implications for the practice and outcomes of co-management. 
 
The attitudes to local co-management structures in Malawi and East Africa reflect the 
findings of Béné et al. (2009). In their review of fisheries co-management in Cameroon, 
Niger, Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia, they argue that the governance balance very much 
remains with the state. Deconcentration was in many cases carried out to local government 
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rather than to local communities, with accountability remaining an upward process, from 
communities to government, rather than from co-management committees to communities. 
They observe that local power brokers, such as traditional authorities and other local elites, 
have benefited from the space created by governments being unable to play a full role in local 
fisheries management. From this, they conclude that instead of improving governance, the 
co-management initiatives have “simply modified the status quo by altering the distribution of 
power and responsibility amongst the main fisheries stakeholders” (Béné et al., 2009, p. 
1943, original emphasis).  
 
In the case of East Africa and Malawi, the boundaries and relations between fisheries 
management committees and local and/or traditional authorities has brought some degree of 
confusion and conflict. Whilst there are examples of supportive and cooperative relations 
between these structures, there are more examples of inharmonious relations. These arise 
from issues concerning who collects and keeps fish levies, who enforces regulations and 
issues sanctions, and who permits migrant fishers to fish from an area. Within a fishery or 
country, there are differences between how fisheries management committees and local 
and/or traditional authorities cooperate for fisheries management, reflecting different 
relationships and institutions, particularly power structures. The interaction between local and 
traditional authorities with co-management structures leads to forms of ‘institutional 
bricolage’, through which fisherfolk mediate ways to secure access to fisheries, resolve 
conflict and avoid sanctions. 
 
Enforcement of rules and regulations is affected by a range of socially-embedded institutions 
interacting with bureaucratic institutions. Friendship, kinship and peer relations create 
unwillingness of some fisheries stakeholders, including members of community-based co-
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management structures, to enforce regulations where there is a relationship to the offender. 
Opportunities to demand or accept bribes in return for allowing fishing during closed seasons 
or returning seized gear by co-management structures, government officers or traditional 
authorities limits the effectiveness of management systems. 
 
Access to benefits from fisheries is influenced by a range of power and social relations 
interacting with bureaucratic institutions.  Power relations influence access to fisheries and to 
decision-making between boat owners and crew (Nunan, 2006), traditional leaders and 
fishers (Njaya et al., 2012) and the attitudes to local co-management structures of fisheries 
officers. Access to benefits is also mediated through interaction between power, social and 
gender relations with formal systems of fishing permits, boat licences and trading licences. It 
is not enough, for example, for women to have a license to trade fish; they may be obliged to 
exchange sex for access to buying (Béné & Merten 2008; Nunan, 2010). Gender relations 
then form part of the institutional bricolage through which people pursue their livelihood 
strategies and the fisheries are managed. Fish agents, or middlemen, also influence access to 
the benefits from fisheries through the provision of access to credit and markets, encouraging 
unsustainable harvesting and fisherfolk migration, with implications for the practice and 
outcomes of co-management (Crona et al., 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the diversity and interaction of institutions through a bricolage perspective 
and how these may impact, or have impacted, on co-management is critical for evaluating the 
potential for success in terms of moving towards more sustainable fisheries and livelihoods. 
Critical Institutionalism encourages deeper exploration of the manoeuvres going on within 
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the system in support of elite interests and supports calls for more attention to be paid to 
enabling downward accountability.  
 
Taking a Critical Institutionalism perspective suggests that the existing institutional landscape 
should be understood, with institutional analysis informing the design and practice of co-
management. It also supports calls for a more flexible, self-organizing, adaptive approach to 
be taken to co-management (Armitage, Berkes, & Doubleday, 2007; Olsson, Folke, & 
Berkes, 2004) and for co-management to be viewed more as a process than as a set of formal 
structures (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005), with flexibility in design to respond to institutional 
challenges and dynamics.  
 
Critical Institutionalism analysis also reveals the potential for resource users to modify 
structures and rules in response to their own understanding and institutional circumstances. 
Resource users utilise and navigate through a range of institutions to gain access to resources, 
opportunities, employment and credit, with impacts on the institutional landscape, livelihoods 
and on the condition of the natural resources. The concept of ‘institutional bricolage’, then, 
well reflects how people access fisheries, how they find ways to continue illegal practices 
despite efforts to control these and how co-management structures and processes are 
influenced and shaped by bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions.  
 
The institutional analysis of co-management within East African and Malawi inland fisheries 
suggests that three areas in particular deserve attention in approaching and supporting co-
management. These are the relationships between the fisheries departments, particularly the 
fisheries officers, and fisherfolk at the beach level; relations between co-management 
structures and those of government and traditional authorities; and, recognition of the 
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importance of gender relations in terms of how people access and benefit from opportunities 
within fisheries and to what extent they ‘participate’, or have the potential to participate, in 
co-management.  
 
Recognizing the range and diversity of institutions that impact on fisheries practices and co-
management should lead to a more informed and effective approach, but would take time and 
a different range of skills to those associated with developing fisheries management 
measures. 
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Table 1: Fisheries institutions from a critical institutionalism perspective 
 
 East Africa Malawi 
Bureaucratic 
institutions 
Fisheries:  
Beach Management Units (BMUs), 
BMU Networks, Co-management 
Committees 
Fish processing plants  
 
Policy and legislation:  
Beach Management Statute (2005), 
National Fisheries Policy (2005) 
BMU rules and regulations 
Local government bylaws 
 
Beyond fisheries: 
Government at village, 
parish/division, district and national 
levels, policies, legislation and 
plans 
Civil society, the judiciary and 
NGOs 
 
Fisheries: 
Beach Village Committees 
Fishermen’s Associations (higher level than 
BVCs. Group BVCs at area or water body 
level) 
 
Policy and legislation: 
Fisheries Conservation and Management 
Act (1997) - empowers the Director of 
Fisheries to appoint BVCs as honorary 
fisheries protection officers. 
 
Beyond fisheries: 
District Assemblies, Area Development 
Committees and Village Development 
Committees. Policies, legislation and plans. 
Magistrates Courts for dealing with fisheries 
offences. 
Other sectoral policies and legislation such 
Land Use Planning and Tourism affect use 
of beaches by fishers 
Socially-
embedded 
institutions 
Social relationships that may 
impact on gaining employment, 
credit or access to buy fish include: 
- kinship 
- gender: women rarely go out 
onto the lake, but process and 
trade fish 
- power relations, such as boat 
owner – crew employment 
negotiations, relations between 
fishers and government officers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social relations facilitate 
knowledge of areas of good catches 
and higher prices and thereby 
migration around the lake. 
Important for access to 
employment, fish and 
accommodation. 
Social relationships that may impact on 
gaining employment, credit and access to 
buying fish include: 
-kinship and ethnicity 
-women do not go out fishing, but may own 
fishing equipment (mostly through 
inheritance) and carry out post-harvest 
activities.  
-Power relations: within fishing units 
include negotiations between gear owners 
and crewmembers regarding benefit sharing 
systems and employment of crewmembers; 
within crews there are hierarchies that also 
determine sharing of benefits among 
crewmembers 
-Power relations: within households limit 
women’s participation in post-harvest 
activities. 
 
Social relations facilitate sharing of 
knowledge of good fishing areas and how 
these change seasonally. Migrant fishers are 
required to pay honorarium to local chiefs 
(in form of money or fish) to be permitted to 
fish from a given chief’s village, which is 
not always in agreement with BVCs. 
 
Examples of 
institutional 
bricolage 
Existing power relations influence 
the election of BMU Committee 
members 
Existing power relations influence who is 
elected to BVCs, with chiefs, powerful gear 
owners and in some instance DoF fisheries 
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Existing relations between fisheries 
communities and fisheries officers 
influence how co-management 
develops – affected by level of 
trust, understanding of roles and 
whether informal tax and bribes 
exist 
 
Enforcement of fisheries 
regulations is enabled and 
constrained through institutional 
bricolage, with rules and 
regulations and patrols, but also 
bribes to fisheries officers and 
BMU Committee members and 
election of BMU Committee 
members who condone illegalities. 
 
Access to fisheries and benefits 
from fisheries is negotiated through 
both bureaucratic and socially-
embedded institutions. These 
include permits and licences, 
registration with a BMU, 
connections to employers and 
access to fish to buy through 
kinship and friendship, and access 
to buy fish through sexual relations. 
 
Loans by fish agents associated 
with processing factories assist 
fishers with gears and ensures fish 
supply to agents. 
extension staff acting as king makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enforcement of regulations is enabled and 
constrained through institutional bricolage, 
with both formal and local informal rules 
being used to enforce regulations and 
influence access to fishing. Bribes to DoF 
fisheries enforcement officers, BVC 
members and chiefs are regularly reported.  
 
 
 
Access to fish and benefits from fishing is 
negotiated mainly through socially-
embedded institutions since officially there 
are no regulations limiting entry. 
Institutions include issuing and demand 
transfer letters and payments, and the role of 
crewmembers in bringing together teams of 
crew on behalf of boat owners. 
 
 
 
Traders are not required to have a license to 
go into fish trade. Some traders gain 
advantage through loans to fishers that 
prioritise them for buying of fish; kinship 
and spousal relationships are also important 
for gaining access to fish. 
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Figure 1 Map of Malawi showing the major Lakes and cities and selected district 
headquarter locations 
 
 
 
 
  
Southeast Arm 
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i
The Participatory Fisheries Management Programme was jointly funded by UNDP, FAO, GTZ, ODA and the 
World Bank (Donda 2001; Hara 2001; Department of Fisheries, 1993). 
ii
 The constitution grants the parliament the powers to enact law for the establishment of traditional local courts 
whose mandates would be to decide cases involving customary laws and some minor criminal offences 
(Gloppen & Kanyongolo, 2007). Since the abolition of the traditional courts on 1994, parliament has never 
passed legislations that would re-instate these. 
iii
 The survey by the Malawi/World Bank Fisheries Development Project: women’s programme found that 
47.7% of fish traders were women. 
